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THE TROUBLE WITH CHAPTER 11
LYNN

M. LoPucKI*

The length of time companies remain in bankruptcy reorganization is critically
important. During that time, the business is at risk because management incentives are
inappropriate, professional fees accrue at a rapid rate, and business uncertainties
increase. Creditors may be injured because the reorganizing debtor does not make
payments during the case and because some creditors are not entitled to accrue interest
during the pendency of the case. In this Article, Professor LoPucki presents data from
several studies showing approximately a 150% increase from 1964 to 1987 in the
median time companies spend in Chapter 11. Using data from other studies, he shows
that the median time large, publicly held companies spend in Chapter 11 did not increase
during that same period. He argues that the increase in the time ordinary companies
remain in Chapter 11 resulted from the adoption in 1978 of a reorganization procedure
appropriate only to the largest bankruptcy reorganization cases. He advocates a number
of procedural changes to remedy the problem; the most important is the adoption of a
separate procedure, applicable to the large majority of bankruptcy cases, that is more
appropriate to their size. Professor LoPucki discusses current efforts to enact such a
procedure and documents resistance to the effort by prominent members of the
bankruptcy bar.

Chapter 11 is in trouble. Critics complain that ailing companies
languish under the protection of the bankruptcy court for years while the
managers who led them to ruin remain in control and continue to make
the decisions.I Some assert that Chapter 11 serves no purpose. 2 In its
Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. I have benefitted greatly from the
comments of Ted Eisenberg, Bob Feidler, Ed Flynn, Kate Heidt, Donald Korobkin, Dan
Keating, Bob Martin, Harvey Miller, Bob Rasmussen, Leonard Rosen, David Skeel, Mike
Sigal, Tom Small, Elizabeth Warren, and Bill Whitford on earlier drafts of this Article.
None is, however, responsible for the views I express. I presented the central ideas in
this Article at the Advanced Bankruptcy Procedures Seminar in Dubuque, Iowa and at a
meeting of the Business Bankruptcy Committee of the American Bar Association in San
Antonio. I received many helpful comments on each occasion. I am also grateful to
Bankruptcy Judge Robert D. Martin, and Bankruptcy Clerk Ann B. Manley of the
Western District of Wisconsin and her staff for providing me with access to data on the
time cases remained pending in that district.
See, e.g., John Greenwald, The Bankruptcy Game, TIME, May 18, 1992, at
1.
60 ("Chapter 11 can be a good opportunity for a company to cleanse itself of past
But how do you do that when you have the same managers and employees
mistakes ....
who created the problems in the first place?"); Michelle Singletary, Panel Votes to Form
Bankruptcy Study Body, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1992, at F1 (discussing the Bradley and
Rosenzweig proposal for repeal of Chapter 11 and quoting Rosenzweig as saying that
"[wlhat is working is managers get to keep their jobs and they are the very ones that led
the company into trouble");, LAURENCE H. KALLEN, CORPORATE WELFARE: THE
MEOABANKRUPTCIES OF THE 80S AND 90S, at ix (1991) ("Chapter 11 permitted
megacorporations. . . [and] allowed the men who ran them to escape the consequences
*
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absence, they say, the market would find more efficient solutions to the
problems of ailing companies. 3 Increasingly, Chapter 1I's critics have
lost interest in reform and instead call for repeal. 4
Much of the criticism is sheer nonsense, spun from misunderstanding
of the reorganization process or economists' fantasies of what life would
be like in a world of perfect markets and zero transaction costs. 5 But it
is also clear that something is very wrong with Chapter 11. In this
Article, I present the thesis that the seemingly unrelated problems that are
now combining to strangle Chapter 11 -the burgeoning expense,6 the
of their greed and incompetence.").
2.
See, e.g., Edith H. Jones, Chapter 11. A Death Penalty for Debtor and
CreditorInterests, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1088 (1992) ("The reason I spoke of it as a death
penalty is that, for all practical purposes, Chapter 11 is not facilitating reorganizations.").
3.
The idea that the market could substitute for Chapter 11 originated with
Professors Baird and Jackson. See Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Casefor Corporate
Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 127-28 (1986) ("Mhe entire law of corporate
reorganizations is hard to justify under any set of facts and virtually impossible when the
debtor is a publicly held corporation."); THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LoGic AND LIMITS
OF BANKuv'rcy LAW 223 (1986) ("There is no reason why chapter 7 could not be used
as the vehicle to sell the firm as a going concern in the same way that companies go
public.")*
It has been repeated numerous times, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Approach
to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775, 785 (1988) (proposing to
substitute a scheme of reorganization in which shareholdings are canceled without
compensation unless shareholders pay their pro rata share of all debts of the company
within four days after notice); James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of
Murphy's Law: Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 MICH.
L. REV. 2097, 2141 (1990) (employing assumptions of perfect markets and other
hypothetical conditions to demonstrate that bankruptcy is unnecessary because debtors will
liquidate and distributed their own assets; "The purpose of this study has been to
demonstrate that we lack any persuasive theory for why we have or ought to have
bankruptcy legislation."); Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL
L. REv. 439, 489 (1992) ("Congress should repeal bankruptcy's reorganization
provisions.").
The idea received a crescendo of publicity with the publication of Michael Bradley
& Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Casefor Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043 (1992)
(hereinafter The Untenable Case). Post Bradley and Rosenzweig refinements and
reiterations can be found in Philippe Aghion et al., The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform,
8 J. L., ECON., & ORO. 523 (1992) (employing Bebchuk's new approach as part of a
"market-based" proposal that would substitute for Chapter 11) and Barry E. Adler, A
Political Theory of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming
1993).
4.
See articles cited supra note 3.
5.
See Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to
Professors Bradley and Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REv. 79 (1992).
6.
The direct costs of bankruptcy, primarily professional fees, are enormous. See
Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of
Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285, 285-89 (1990) (estimating direct costs for publicly held
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excessive debtor leverage, 7 the poor performance of the reorganizing
companies,' and the high rate of recidivism-stem largely from a single
source. In its current form, Chapter 11 permits debtors to remain under
Bankruptcy
court protection for an excessive period of time.
reorganization can be effective only when the cases move quickly.
Because the cases have slowed, the process has been disintegrating.
In the first part of this Article, I explain why the pace of bankruptcy
reorganization matters. In the second, I use data from several empirical
studies of the length of bankruptcy reorganizations from 1941 to the
present to document my charge that the adoption of Chapter 11 has more
than doubled the median length of reorganization cases. As a clue
regarding. the etiology of this disease, I also show that no such increase
in time-in-Chapter- 1I occurred among the cases of large, publicly held
companies. In the third part, I speculate on how the adoption of Chapter
11 brought about this selective increase in the time ordinary cases remain

under Chapter 11. In the fourth, I propose several means for shortening
firms at three percent of assets); Edward I. Altman, A FurtherEmpiricalInvestigation of
the Bankruptcy Cost Question, 39 J. FIN. 1067, 1077 (1984) (average of direct bankruptcy
cost to value of the company ratio for publicly held companies was six percent). To
appreciate the enormity of these costs, one must realize that a substantial percentage of
the assets of most Chapter 11 debtors are pledged to creditors who cannot be compelled
to contribute to payment of the debtor's professional fees. Shareholders and unsecured
creditors, who must bear the entire burden, experience the fees as a much larger portion
of their debtor companies.
The indirect costs may be far greater than the direct costs. See Lynn M. LoPucki
& William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 669, 753 (1993) [hereinafter
LoPucki & Whitford, CorporateGovernance]; Robert H. Mnookin & Robert B. Wilson,
Rational Bargainingand Market Efficiency: UnderstandingPennzoil v. Texaco, 75 VA.
L. REV. 295 (1989) (attributing a $3.5 billion decline in the combined trading values of
Texaco and Pennzoil stock to the threat of bankruptcy by Texaco and the resulting costs).
See, e.g., Metzenbaum ChargesFeesLeave Littlefor Those System is Supposed to Protect,
Pensions & Benefits Daily (BNA) (Mar. 31, 1992).
7.
See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-ystems Failure
Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code? (pt. 1), 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99 (1983)
[hereinafter LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control 11; Jerome R. Kerkman, The Debtor in
Full ControL" A Case ForAdoption of the Trustee System, 70 MARQ. L. REv. 159 (1987)
[hereinafter Kerkman, The Debtor in Full Control].
See, e.g., Federal News Service, Sept. 5, 1991 ("Many small businesses
8.
cannot survive the trauma of bankruptcy because... their suppliers won't supply them,
their customers won't buy from them, their employees don't want to stay, and they die
of attrition rather than getting reorganized.").
9.
See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy
Reorganizationof Large, Publicy Held Companies, 78 CoRNELL L. REV. (forthcoming
1993) [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Patterns](32% of the companies to emerge from
the largest bankruptcy reorganizations refiled within a few years).
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the time companies, both small and large, spend in reorganization. In the
fifth part, I describe the politics that led Congress to adopt a
reorganization procedure so ill-suited to the large majority of cases it
governs and explain how those politics may now prevent Congress from

correcting its error.
I. WHY TIME IN CHAPTER

11 MATrERS

While a company remains insolvent, powerful economic incentives
press its owners and managers toward reckless, high risk, short term
investment policies. In earlier work, William Whitford and I developed
this point with regard to the owners and managers of large, publicly held
companies who typically are not the same people. 0 My discussion here
is limited to the far more common case" in which the owners
themselves manage the business. I will refer to them as "ownermanagers."
Creditors are entitled to absolute priority over the owner-managers
in the value of a company. 12 For that reason, when a company is
insolvent, 3 the value of the owner-managers' interest approaches
zero." With their shares already near worthless, owner-managers may
10.
See LoPucki & Whitford, CorporateGovernance, supra note 6.
11.
Owner-managers exist in the large majority of all reorganizing companies.
See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code? (pt. 2), 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247, 264 (1983) [hereinafter
LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control In] (only two of 35 companies filing Chapter 11 (6%)
had more than three shareholders and were not family owned). But Whitford and I found
that no such group existed in a large majority of the largest publicly held companies that
reorganized from 1979 to 1988. See LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra
note 6, at 689. Thus, the arguments I make in this part with regard to owner-managers
do not, strictly speaking, apply to most of the largest publicly held companies. In those
companies management may be largely free of owner control and sometimes will be
captured by creditors. Id. The economic incentives are more complex when the owners
do not manage the company or control those who do. But the main point I make in this
part-that economic incentives propel those in control of the debtor company in directions
that are not in the economic interests of the company-remains true in the largest publicly
held companies as well. Id. at 719-20, 752-53.
12.
The absolute priority rule is reflected in the Bankruptcy Code requirements
for confirmation of a plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (1988) [hereinafter, Title 11
provisions will be cited as "Bankruptcy Code § _"].
In essence, they prohibit
confirmation of a plan that provides for a class of junior claims or interests from
participating in the distribution unless the claims of all senior classes are to be paid in full.
13.
I use the term here in the "bankruptcy sense" of a debtor having liabilities that
exceed the value of its assets. See Bankruptcy Code § 101 (definition of "insolvent").
14.
The value of the interest will not reach zero until creditors implement the
absolute priority rule, typically through some kind of legal action. Until they do so, the
owner-managers enjoy a position which they can exploit or "sell" to the creditors. For
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have little more to lose.15 Yet even though the owner-managers'
ownership interests may be far "under water," creditors can terminate
them only through an event such as the confirmation of a plan of
reorganization or a liquidation of the company's assets. Creditors
generally find that difficult to accomplish. Chapter 11, permits ownermanagers to retain control of their companies and manage them during
reorganizations. 16 In practice, Chapter 11 also enables many owner-

managers of insolvent companies to retain control of the companies and
their own jobs after reorganization.

7

But, at the insistence of creditors,

Chapter 11 requires that even owner-managers of such companies
surrender the value of their interests to creditors at confirmation."

Thus, during reorganization, the owner-managers of an insolvent
company remain in a position to benefit from sufficiently large increases
in the value of the company. Yet they cannot suffer major financial
losses from even the largest decreases in its value. Because they retain

the benefits of risk taking without suffering a corresponding share of the
losses, it may be in their interests that the company take risks not justified

by the expected returns to the company. To illustrate, assume that Debtor
Company has assets worth $1 million and liabilities of only a slightly

larger amount. It might be in the economic interests of the ownermanagers of Debtor Company to bet the $1 million in assets on the flip
of a coin if they could.

If Debtor Company won, the value of the shares

the owner-manager, exploitation may include taking a salary from the debtor company
during the reorganization case that is greater than the owner-manager would otherwise
earn during that period.
15.
The point was illustrated dramatically by an exhibit introduced in evidence in
the KenDavis Industries case. One of the owner-managers had apparently written: "As
Barb continues to repeat and everyone agrees there is no shareholder equity-so we've got
nothing to lose. The banks have it all on the line now-not us." In re KenDavis Indus.
Int'l, Inc., 91 B.R. 742, 765 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
16.
With regard to small cases, see LoPucki, The Debtorin Full Control I1, supra
note 11, at 258-63 (debtors remained in control as long as they chose to in 46 of 48 cases
(96%)). With regard to cases of large, publicly held corporations, see LoPucki &
Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 6, at 699-700 (no trustee or quasi trustee
was appointed to replace debtors in possession in 38 of 43 cases (88%)).
See LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control I, supra note 11, at 264 (owner17.
managers retained control of nine of twelve surviving companies).
18.
See, for example, Bankruptcy Code §1 129(b)(2)(B), prohibiting shareholders
from receiving or retaining any property on account of their shares, unless the plan
provides creditors with full payment of their prepetition claims. Owner-managers may
nevertheless be able to retain control under a plan by which they purchase control of the
emerging company for "new value." See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, A Theory of Absolute
Priority, 1991 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 9, 39-42.
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would leap from a nominal amount'9 to $1 million; 20 if Debtor
Company lost, the shareholders would lose only their shares, which had

21
little value anyway.
Even if the bet on the flip of the coin was a bad bet from the point
of view of Debtor Company, it might remain a good one from the point
of view of the owner-managers. For example, if no better bet were
available, it would be in the interest of the owner-managers that Debtor
Company grant ten to one odds on a flip that Debtor Company had a 50%
chance of losing. If Debtor Company won $100,000, the ownermanager's stock would increase in value by nearly that amount; if Debtor
Company lost $1 million, it would be money that otherwise would have
gone to creditors anyway.
In many cases, the financial condition of the company will be so bad
that the business cannot be restored to solvency. While that may remove
the owner-managers' inappropriate incentive toward high risk investment,
it does not substitute appropriate incentives. For the duration of the
Chapter 11 case, the owner-managers are likely to remain in control of

the business, while both increases and decreases in value accrue almost
entirely to creditors. In these circumstances, the incentives of the owner-

managers become more rather than less bizarre.'
19.
If a company with assets of a value slightly less than the amount of its
liabilities is liquidated, the shareholders will receive no distribution. In that sense, the
shares are sometimes referred to as "worthless" or "under water." In reality, however,
the creditors of such a company will find it difficult to force a liquidation. The ownermanagers can seek refuge in Chapter 11. Once there, a variety of factors combine to
assure that shareholders will receive at least a nominal share of the distribution, even
though they would be entitled to nothing in a cram down. See Lynn M. LoPucki &
William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization
of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 143-58 (1990) [hereinafter
LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share]. In the cases of some marginally
solvent companies, the distributions to shareholders were substantial. Id. at 166.
20.
After collecting on the bet, the assets of the company would be $2 million.
Its liabilities would continue to be $1 million, leaving a shareholder equity of $1 million.
21.
See supra note 19.
22.
Owner-managers may pursue any of the following objectives during the
remainder of the case: (1) maximize their direct compensation from the company; (2)
maneuver the company in a manner that benefits other businesses in which they or their
allies have a stake; (3) extort benefits from the creditors, in the form of severance pay or
settlement of a claim they have against the company, in return for an earlier end to the
Chapter 11 case; or (4) maneuver to purchase the company at a bargain price. See LYNN
M. LoPucmI,

STRATEOIES FOR CREDITORS iN BANKRUPTcY PROCEEDINoS

§11.3.7,

§11.11.2 (2d ed. 1991). Of course, they might also abandon their own self interest, and
exercise the powers they enjoy as debtor in possession on behalf of their creditors, but to
assume this will ordinary be the case is naive.
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From these examples, it should be apparent that the interests of the
owner-managers can differ sharply from the interests of Debtor Company.
The potential for sharp difference will continue until the owner-managers
have a sufficient cushion of equity that they again bear at least the brunt
of the risk of Debtor Company's losses and therefore regard the
company's money as their own. Arguably, the principal purpose of
corporate reorganization is to restore the "cushion of equity"' and,
along with it, appropriate incentives for the owner-managers.
If the restoration does not occur through increases in the value of the
business during the Chapter 11 case, creditors eventually will be able to
bring it about by more drastic means. Confirmation of a creditors' plan
might extinguish the old equity and convert debt into new equity;'
conversion to Chapter 7 will lead to a sale of the productive assets to
someone who presumably will have an equity in them. Thus, in their
attempt to restore the cushion of equity through high risk investment, the
owner-managers are working against a deadline. That the deadline is
flexible' makes it no less real. The investment the owner-managers seek
must not only be high risk, it must also have a quick pay out.
The incentives of the owner-managers are similarly perverse with
regard to any proposed sale of the company. If Debtor Company must
sell its assets, the owner-managers will maximize their own return by
insisting on a price well above their $1 million value. It is true that
unless a potential buyer made the mistake of paying such a price, the
owner-managers' insistence would simply kill the possibility of a sale,
leaving the owners with nothing. But that is a risk they cannot escape;
if they sold the company for the $1 million it was worth, all of the

23.
CharlesW. Adams, An EconomicJustificationforCorporateReorganizations,
20 HoFsTRA L. REv. 117 (1991). In the cases of large, publicly held companies, the
process often fails to achieve this purpose because the plans provide for insufficient
reductions in the amounts of debt owing. See LoPucki & Whitford, Patterns, supra note
9.
24.
Extinguishments that transfer control of the company routinely occur in the
largest cases. See LoPucki & Whitford, Patterns, supra note 9. Extinguishments by
confirmation of a plan are much less common in small cases because creditors are, as a
practical matter, usually unable to operate the emerging company without the help of the
owner-managers. See LoPucki, The Debtor in Full ControlI1,supranote 11, at 263-66.
The principal threat to the owner-managers of small companies is that cash flow will be
insufficient for them to continue operations. But the need for cash flow may drive the
owner-managers of small companies to reckless risk taking of a nature similar to that
described here for the owner-managers of large companies.
25.
Time can run out on owner-managers in a variety of ways. Small companies
typically exhaust their cash reserves leaving them without the ability to pay expenses
necessary to continue to operate. See LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control II, supra note
11, at 261. The owner-managers of larger companies may lose control by confirmation
of a creditor plan, conversion of the case to Chapter 7, or a lifting of the automatic stay.
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proceeds would go to the creditors, leaving the owners with nothing
anyway.' As a result, owner-managers tend to over estimate the value
of their companies' assets, by however much is necessary to leave them
with a substantial equity.' Their tendency to assert sometimes absurdly
high values is one element of the debtor state of mind that bankruptcy
lawyers and judges refer to. as "terminal euphoria."'
In recognition of the differing interests that creditors and ownermanagers will have in the event of insolvency, sophisticated creditors of
large companies typically contract in advance for the right to draconian
remedies as the company approaches insolvency." But by taking the
company into Chapter 11, the owner-managers can typically slow or
entirely prevent enforcement of such contract provisions."
In place of contractual restraints on the tendencies of the ownermanagers to serve their own self interests, bankruptcy law imposes
fiduciary duties, a modicum of court oversight, and a norm of prudent
investment. 1 Over the short run, these substitutes are generally
26.
That is, if the company in the forgoing example were sold for $1 million in
cash, the creditors, who hold $1 million in claims, would have the right under the
absolute priority rule to have all of the proceeds paid on their claims. Because the estate
had already been reduced to cash, most of the leverage that enables shareholders to win
deviations from the absolute priority rule would be absent. See LoPucki & Whitford,
Corporate Governance, supra note 6, at 685-86. Creditors could probably win
confirmation of a plan that paid in accord with the absolute priority rule.
27.
This problem is less prominent in the cases of large, publicly held companies
because creditors often capture control of the company and the sale process. See LoPucki
& Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 6, at 702-03. McLouth Steel is an
example of a case in which that occurred. Id. at 702.
28.
See, e.g., Inre Lakeside 1. Corp., 104 B.R. 468,470-71 (Bankr. M. D. Fla.
1989):
mhe difficulty with the values stated by [the Debtor's expert] is evident
because his opinion is based not on existing facts, on the present condition of
the property as it stands today, but on future hopes and expectations wholly
unsupported by this record. . . .In light of the past history of this subject
property, it is not really an overstatement to characterize this reorganization
attempt as something which is based on "terminal euphoria" of the
Debtor ....
29.
The typical contract provision requires that the company maintain a specified
equity to debt ratio. As the company approaches insolvency, it will breach the covenant.
The breach will constitute a default, entitling the creditor to file suit immediately. See,
e.g., Gatx Leasing Corp. v. Capital Bank & Trust Co., 717 F. Supp. 1160 (M.D. La.
1988) (discussing the operation of such a provision). If the creditor is secured, the suit
will seek immediate possession of the collateral; otherwise the suit will seek a judgment
which will serve as the basis for the seizure of the company's assets.
30.
They do so principally through the mechanism of the automatic stay. See
Bankruptcy Code'§ 362(a).
31.
See LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 6, at 706-10,
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sufficient to prevent the owner-managers from taking the company to Las
Vegas' or looting it. But given enough time, the owner-managers will
find subtler ways to capture a substantial portion of the creditors'
expectancy. If the company is within reach of solvency, they can gamble
on high risk strategies to bust a union," to try a new marketing
concept,' or to bring a new product to the market place.35 If not, they
can serve their personal interests in ways that do not depend on the
success of the company.'
In the context of large, publicly held companies, Whitford and I
considered several means by. which the incentives of incumbent
managements might be redirected. We concluded that shareholders who
benefit from high risk investment strategies by reorganizing companies
should be required to transfer a portion of their shares to the creditors
disadvantaged by them.3' But we also concluded that the surest means
for controlling reorganization management is to limit the time companies
can spend in reorganization."
The poor investment policies fostered by the separation of the risk
of loss from the possibility of gain are not the only inefficiencies
associated with prolonged insolvency. First, as creditors struggle to
protect their investments, both sides incur substantial direct expenses,
primarily in the form of professional fees. Bankruptcy professionals work
by the hour; the longer the case, the higher the fees. Second, even aside
716-19, 776-78.
See, e.g., In re Tri-State Paving, Inc., 32 B.R. 2, 3 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982),
32.
in which the owner-managers literally took all of the company's cash to Las Vegas in an
attempt to win enough money "to pay the corporate-debtor's creditors and solve the
financial problems of all three debtors. .. "
33.
Frank Lorenzo's Texas Air purchased a controlling interest in Continental
Airlines cheaply when the latter was already in serious financial difficulty. Continental
filed Chapter 11, locked the union out, and attempted to hire a new, non-union labor force
while selling tickets to anywhere in the U.S. for $49. Creditors opposed the scheme.
Had it been unsuccessful, they would have borne most of the cost.
While in Chapter 11, Sambo's Restaurants borrowed against its unencumbered
34.
assets and invested the money in changing the name, look, and concept of its restaurants.
The gamble failed, the money was lost, and unsecured creditors ended up with only about
11 cents on the dollar.
35.
Storage Technology brought a new data-storage device to the market during
its Chapter 11 case. The product was so successful that the company was solvent with
a substantial cushion of equity by the time it emerged.
36.
See supra note 22.
37.
We refer to such transfers as "risk compensation payments." See LoPucki
& Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 6, at 788-96. We also suggested,
somewhat less forcefully, that risk compensation payment run in the opposite direction to
encourage creditor-dominated managements to take higher risks. Id. at 795-96.
38.
Id. at 787-88.
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from the problems caused by the tendency toward overly risky investment
when owner-managers are in control," insolvent companies generally
perform poorly. Customers and suppliers are leery of them because their
futures appear uncertain and because cash shortages often disrupt their
operations, injuring both the insolvent companies and their trading
partners. Their managements spend substantial amounts of time in court
and otherwise tending to legal matters, leaving less time to tend to
operations. Managers' jobs are often insecure 4° and their duties are
unclear. 1
Third, once a debtor defaults on the debt to its primary lenders the
debtor typically has little reason to pay other creditors. The debtor's
credit rating is no longer of concern, because credit is unavailable
anyway. The lawsuits filed by creditors are similarly unimpressive,
because they can be blocked by the filing of a Chapter 11 case.
Acceleration of long term debt is no longer a threat; the acceleration can
be reversed through the eventual confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan. As
a result, a common strategy for a debtor who cannot avoid default is to
suspend payments to all its creditors. Chapter 11 not only permits this
strategy, it mandates it.' 2 These mass suspensions of payments can
severely disrupt the businesses and lives of creditors. For example, by
filing under Chapter 11, the Manville company was able to entirely avoid
making any payment on billions of dollars of unsecured claims for about
six years. The claimants who were put off for that period of time
included not only commercial creditors, but all of Manville's tens of
thousands of asbestos health victims. None got so much as a nickel, even
for necessary medical treatment.' Such a suspension of payments by
39.
In our study of large, publicly held companies, Whitford and I found that
creditors often took control. See LoPucki & Whitford, CorporateGovernance, supranote
6, at 742-47. When they did, there may have been a tendency toward inappropriately low
risk investment. Id. at 778. These conflicting tendencies do not offset one another
because typically only one or the other operates at any given time. Id. at 788-96.
40.
See id. at 737.
41.
Id. To restrain managers from either the excessively high risk investments
that would serve the interests of shareholders' or the overly conservative investment
policies that would serve the interests of most creditors, bankruptcy law imposes vague
fiduciary duties on managers. A norm of bankruptcy practice has arisen that restricts
managers to what Whitford and I have termed a "prudent" investment policy. Id. at 77678. Given the sharply conflicting interests of creditors and shareholders in many cases,
putting the company in a "holding pattern" during the reorganization case is probably a
wise course, but by eliminating investment options that might be optimal, it can put the
company at a competitive disadvantage.
42.
See LOPUCKI, STRATEGIES FOR CREDrrORS, supranote 22, §§ 10.3.4, 11.3.9.
43.
Though Manville did not produce a reported opinion on point, another mass
tort case did. See Official Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Mabey, 832 F.2d 299, 302
(4th Cir. 1987) (Bankruptcy Code prohibits disbursements to tort creditors for emergency
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one debtor often forces creditors of that debtor into bankruptcy, creating

a domino effect.
Lastly, because of the peculiar rule that undersecured creditors
cannot accrue interest on even the secured portions of their claims during
bankruptcy cases, Chapter 11 cases result in wealth transfers from

undersecured creditors to unsecured creditors and/or the debtor." The
rate of this transfer is substantial and the amount increases in direct
proportion to the length of the case.'

Bankruptcy theorists have been slow to acknowledge the problems
that result from extended bankruptcy reorganization cases. In fact, much
of the economic literature views "bankruptcy" as a point in time, not even
as a proceeding that takes place over a period of time.'
But the
lengthening of the time its takes to reorganize has made the associated

problems increasingly difficult to ignore.
II. THE DRAMATIC INCREASE IN TIME IN CHAPTER 11
Figure 1 shows the results of the five all-case empirical studies of the
length of bankruptcy reorganization cases that resulted in confirmation of
a plan. By "all-case," I mean that the study included all Chapter XI or
Chapter 11 cases in a particular district or group of districts.47 In the
treatment until a plan is confirmed).
44.
Compare THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMrTs OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW 181-90 (1986) (the payment of interest on secured claims is necessary to give
secured creditors the value of their state law rights) with United Savings Ass'n of Texas
v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., 484 U.S. 365 (1988) (see infra note 45).
45.
In its landmark decision in the Timbers case, the Supreme Court reinforced
the rule denying creditors interest on undersecured debt. To the assertion that as a result
of the rule undersecured creditors would face large losses from inordinate and extortionate
delay, the Court in essence responded that the bankruptcy courts would not allow the
cases to go on for extended periods of time.' They filled a footnote with citations to cases
aborted in less than a year, Timbers, 484 U.S. at 376 n. 1, and encouraged the bankruptcy
courts to carefully examine cases even in their first four months, id. at 376. Apologists
for the Court explained that after Timbers, Chapter 11 cases would be disposed of more
quickly. There is, however, no evidence that has come to pass.
46.
E.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, BargainingAfter the Fall and
the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 738 (1988); Jeremy I.
Bulow & John B. Shoven, The Bankruptcy Decision, 9 BELL J. ECON. 437, 454 (1978)
("In contrast with earlier studies, we have treated bankruptcy as a decision of the bank
lender where the criterion for bankruptcy is whether or not the coalition of claimants with
negotiating power can gain from immediate liquidation.").
47.
Neither Chapter Xl nor Chapter 11 is synonymous with business bankruptcy
reorganization. Stanley and Girth excluded business bankruptcy reorganizations that
proceeded under Chapters X and XII. The other four studies excluded business
bankruptcy reorganization cases that proceeded under Chapter 13. But the numbers of
cases thus excluded are small. See infra note 67.
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first of these studies, David Stanley and Marjorie Girth found that debtors
who successfully reorganized in six districts in 1964 were under Chapter
XI for a median time of about eight months." In the second, I found
that debtors who successfully reorganized in the Western District of
Missouri during the first year after the effective date of the Bankruptcy
Code were in Chapter 11 for a median time of about 9.5 months.' 9 In
the third, Jerome Kerkman found that debtors who successfully
reorganized in the Eastern District of Wisconsin during 1982 were in
24-
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Figure 1. Median time all companies spent in Chapter 11 in the years
indicated, according to various studies.

48.
DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS
AND REFORM (1971). The eight month 'figUre is an estimate I derived from the data
reported by Stanley and Girth. Stanley and Girth did not report an average time in
Chapter XI or even a median time for all Chapter XI cases. They did, however, report
that 38% of the confirmed plans were one-payment plans and 62% were deferred payment
plans, id. at 138, and that the median time in Chapter XI for single payment plan cases
was six months, while the corresponding time for deferred payment plans was nine
months. My estimate is a weighted average of the medians for the two periods.
Stanley and Girth's figures may actually overstate the median times for
reorganization in the entire United States at that time. One of the six districts in their
study was the Southern District of New York, where cases tended to take considerably
longer than elsewhere. Had New York not been included, Stanley and Girth's medians
probably would have been less than six months. See id. at 143.
49.
LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control II, supra note 11, at 269. The
Bankruptcy Code applied to all cases filed on or after October 1, 1979. My study
included all cases filed from October 1, 1979 to September 30, 1980.
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Chapter 11 for a median time of about twelve months.'
In the fourth,
Ed Flynn, of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, found that
debtors whose cases remained open after confirmation in fifteen districts
had been in Chapter 11 for a median time of about 21.6 months before
1971-83 Franks & Torous
30-
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YEAR OF CASES STUDIED
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Figure 2. Median time large, publicly held companies spent in Chapter 11
in the years indicated, according to various studies.

their plans were confirmed. 51 In the most recent of these studies, I
found that debtors who successfully reorganized in the Madison Division
of the Western District of Wisconsin in 1987 and 1988 were in Chapter
50.

Kerkman, The Debtor in Full Control, supra note 7, at 205-06.

Kerkman

does not report a median, but does report the data from which the median can be derived.
I calculated the median from his data.

51.
Flynn acknowledges that his methodology tended to exaggerate the time
debtors remained in Chapter 11. He used data that had been compiled by Ernst & Young,
Inc. on 2400 Chapter 11 cases for other purposes. The sample consisted of all cases that
remained open after confirmation of a plan at the time the sample was taken. Flynn
reports that "Ernst & Young only reviewed chapter 11 cases filed prior to 1987 which
were still pending. It is likely that the cases which were confirmed and closed prior to
the study [which were excluded] moved from filing to confirmation faster than the study
cases." ED FLYNN, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER 11, at 23 (1989).
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11 for a median time of 17.5 months.52 On the face of the data, it
appears that the length of bankruptcy reorganization cases has more than
doubled since the 1960s.
In evaluating this conclusion, several cautions are in order. First,
these studies were not conducted in the same districts. The differences
shown may be wholly or partly attributable to differences among districts
rather than differences over time." Second, even though the LoPucki
and Kerkman studies included all Chapter 11 cases in the district or
division, the numbers of cases were small. Third, even though
bankruptcy is governed by Federal law, the bankruptcy system operates
differently from district to district. A study in one district does not
necessarily indicate what is occurring at the same time in other
districts.'
For these reasons, further study may be necessary to
ascertain the magnitude of the increase in the time debtors spend in
successful reorganizations. But the data leave little doubt that an increase
of substantial magnitude has occurred.
Figure 2 shows the results of several studies of the length of the
bankruptcy reorganization cases of large, publicly held companies.'
The companies included in these studies were much larger than those
included in the all-case studies shown in Figure 1. That the value of the
assets of the smallest company included in the LoPucki-Whitford study
($100 million) was about 300 to 500 times the value of the assets of the
median company proceeding in Chapter 11 during the same period'
52.
1 conducted this study in October of 1992, using the computerized and
noncomputerized docket sheets of the Bankruptcy Court. A list of the cases that resulted
in confirmation of a plan appears in the Appendix at the end of this Article. During the
period covered by this study, the Madison Bankruptcy Court had a relatively light- case
load and relatively clear dockets. Many other Bankruptcy Courts had high caseloads and
lengthy dockets during this period, suggesting that the medians in other districts will be
higher rather than lower than that in Madison.
53.
The two multi-district studies both included the Southern District of New
York, as well as smaller districts, suggesting that the districts studied will prove to have
been comparable. My thesis that there has been a dramatic increase in the median time
for Chapter 11 reorganization is borne out in the comparison of the New York data from
the two studies. See infra note 86.
54.
The three one-district studies were in districts where the dockets were
relatively uncrowded during the periods studied, suggesting that any error will be in the
direction of under estimating rather than over estimating time in Chapter 11.
55.
These studies, like the all-case studies, include only companies that completed
their reorganizations by obtaining confirmation of a plan of reorganization.
56.
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR U.S. TRUSTEE,
AN

EVALUATION

OF THE U.S.

TRUSTEE PILOT

PROGRAM FOR

BANKRUPTCY

ADMINISTRATION 47 (1983) (hereinafter ABT STUDY] (reporting a median asset size for
all cases in nonpilot districts of $205,000 and in pilot districts of $313,000; the median
for all cases was not given).
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demonstrates the magnitude of the difference.
In the earliest of these large case studies, Edward Altman found that
ninety large companies that filed under Chapters X or XI of the
Bankruptcy Act from 1941 to 1979, were in reorganization for a median
time of twenty months." In a study that overlapped the periods of the
Act and the Code,' Julian Franks and Walter Torous collected data
showing that the median time twenty-seven large, publicly held companies
spent in bankruptcy reorganization was thirty-two months." In a later
study of eighty-nine publicly held companies, Stuart Gilson, Kose John,
and Larry Lang found that the median time in Chapter 11 was eighteen
months.'
In studies of the largest, publicly held companies to
reorganize since the effective date of the Bankruptcy Code in 1979,
Whitford and I found a median time of twenty-four months,61 Altman
found a median time of 17.1 months,' and Edie Hotchkiss found a
median time of 16.2 months.'
As shown in Figure 2, several of these studies overlap as to the time
periods covered but show substantially different lengths of time in
reorganization. Most of the differences can be reconciled through the
EDWARD I. ALTMAN, CORPORATE FINANCIAL DISTRESS 26 (1983).
58.
The nonrandom sample was of companies that filed for bankruptcy
reorganization from 1971 to 1983. Sample selection was biased toward large, publicly
traded firms. Julian R. Franks & Walter N. Torous, An EmpiricalInvestigation of U.S.
Firms in Reorganization,44 J. FIN. 747, 752 (1989).
59.
Id. at 753. Before calculating the median, I removed from the sample the
three railroad reorganizations that averaged over 10 years in length. With the railroad
reorganizations included, the median for the 30 firms would have been 34 months.
60.
See Stuart C. Gilson et al., Troubled Debt Restructurings: An EmpiricalStudy
of Private Reorganizationsof Firms in Default, 27 J. FIN. EcON. 315, 336 (1990).
61.
We included only publicly held companies with assets of $100 million or
more, that reorganized between October of 1979 and March of 1988. There were 43 such
companies. The data is reported in Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue
Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held
Companies, 1991 WIs. L. REV. 11 [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Venue Choice].
Our methodology tended to understate the time spent under Chapter 11 because we
included cases only if they resulted in confirmation of a plan by March 15, 1988. Longer
cases filed during the period covered had less chance of inclusion than shorter cases,
because plan confirmation was more likely to take place only after our closing date.
62.
Altman included 284 of the largest companies to reorganize under Chapter 11
from 1979 to 1991. Edward I. Altman, Evaluating the Chapter 11 BankruptcyReorganization Process (Jan: 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Author). Based
on the data he collected in the two studies, Altman concluded that the average time in
Chapter 11 for large, publicly held companies "has been shortened somewhat under the
[19781 Code. .. "
63.
Hotchkiss included all publicly held companies that reorganized from 1979
to 1991. There were 693 such companies. Telephone interview with Edie Hotehkiss
(Nov. 1992).
57.
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realization that among large companies, unlike among those of ordinary
size," the time it takes to reorganize is a function of company size. The
studies finding the longest times in reorganization for large companies
were those that studied the largest cases.'
64.
See FLYNN, supra note 51, at 27 ("The amount of assets listed by the debtor
seems to have very little impact on the length of time it takes for the case to get from
filing to confirmation .... Cases with assets between $100,000 and $100,000,000 all
seem to proceed to confirmation at about the same pace. [Presenting data]").
65.
Only a few of these studies indicate the sizes of the companies in their
samples. But it is very likely that the sizes of the companies studied are inverse to the
sample sizes. The number of publicly held companies filing under Chapter 11 is small.
The samples in all of these studies were drawn from the same small pool. Researchers
who have studied fewer than all of them have generally concentrated on the largest. For
example, Whitford and I studied all companies with assets exceeding $100 million in
value. Altman included most of our companies, along with additional ones that enabled
him to achieve' a sample size of 284 companies. While his sample was not drawn
systematically, he concentrated on larger companies. Hotchkiss included all publicly held
companies filing for reorganization, thus including many that were too small to be of
interest to Altman.
A second factor may account for some of the difference in results. Whitford and
I had an earlier cut off date for our study than did the Altman and Hotchkiss studies.
Only two of 43 cases in our study (5%) were prepackaged. Prepackaged cases probably
became more common in later years, with the result that the Altman and Hotchkiss studies
may have included larger proportions of them. The effect would be to shorten the median
time in Chapter 11 for the cases they studied, without necessarily indicating that the
problems discussed in Part I of this Article have been alleviated. Whatever the cause, the
effect is that the larger the number of cases studied, the lower the median time they
generally spent in Chapter 11.
Table 1
Median time in Chapter 11 as a function of the size of the large, publicly held
companies included in the study.
Number
of cases

Median time in
Chapter 11

Franks & Torous

27

32 months

LoPucki & Whitford

43

24 months

Altman (before 1979)

90

20 months

Gilson

89

18 months

Altman (after 1979)

284

17.1 months

Hotchkiss

693

16.2 months

The apparent anomaly in Table 1 is that Gilson's number of cases (89) was smaller
than Altman's (90) but yielded a shorter median time in reorganization. The explanation
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From the studies described in this part, I conclude that the effect on
time-in-reorganization of the adoption of Chapter 11 in 1978 was very
different for large and small companies. For the largest companies,
which were already taking a median time of twenty months or more to
reorganize under Chapter X or Chapter XI of the old law, the adoption
of Chapter 11 had little impact. But for the smaller companies, that were
taking a median time of only about eight months to reorganize, the change
from Chapter XI to Chapter 11 was a disaster. The time it took these
companies to reorganize more than doubled.'
Ill. How THE ADOPrON OF CHAPTER I I SLOWED REORGANIZATION
Why did the adoption of Chapter I I have such a different effect on
large and small cases? In this part, I will argue that the procedures of
Chapter I I were designed for the cases of large, publicly held companies.
When these large-case procedures were applied to ordinary reorganization
cases, the dynamics of ordinary cases became more like the dynamics of
large cases. Time in Chapter II for the two kinds of cases simply

converged.
Chapter 11 replaced three chapters of the former law under which
business debtors had been able to reorganize. Chapter X had served
small numbers of large, publicly held companies; Chapter XI had
processed the large bulk of business reorganization cases; and Chapter XII
had served a relatively small number.of individual debtors with real estate
may be that Altman studied the largest companies; Gilson limited his study to companies
listed on a stock exchange, which would have excluded some of the largest. See Gilson
et al., supra note 60, at 326. Thus Altman's cases may have been larger than Gilson's.
Flynn found a relationship between size and time to confirmation for companies with
assets of $100 million or more, but found no such relationship for smaller companies.
See supra note 64. The hypothesis I present here suggests that, at least for publicly held
companies, the relationship between size and time to confirmation holds for companies
with assets in excess of about $10 million. Those cases still represent only a tiny fraction
of all cases filed under Chapter 11.
66.
Some increase in the,time companies spend in reorganization is perhaps to be
expected. One might suppose that the median size business reorganizing in Chapter 11
today is both larger and more complex than the, median size business reorganizing in
1964. But caution is warranted. First, there is no data on which to base a comparison
of the size and complexity of the two groups of businesses. Measured in dollars, the
difference would certainly be great, but that difference would be principally the product
of inflation, which should have no effect on time in Chapter 11. Second, Flynn found that
among all but the largest companies, the effect of size on time in Chapter 11 is small.
See supra notes 51, 64, 65. Third, that aggressive case management reduces time in
Chapter 11 to roughly what it was in 1964 suggests that procedures, rather than changes
in the nature of the companies reorganizing, account for the bulk of the change of time
in Chapter 11. See infra text accompanying notes 87-95.
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holdings.'
The new Chapter 11 combined elements of all three
procedures and made some innovations. The large bulk of the cases that
would go through Chapter 11 were cases that, under the former law,
would have been filed under Chapter XI.
An argument can be made that the slowing of these cases resulted in
part from an expansion of relief available under Chapter 11 over what had
been available under Chapter XI. Based on the data presented in this
Article and my experience as a bankruptcy practitioner during the
transition from Chapter XI to Chapter 11, that seems less plausible than
the procedural cause theory that I will now elaborate."
Under Chapter XI, the first consideration of the time it would take
to reorganize typically occurred at a "meeting of creditors" held only
about thirty days into the case. The bankruptcy judge presided at the
meeting and frequently used it as an opportunity to speed the cases along.
Because the debtor also attended the meeting and gave testimony, the
judge could consider the size, complexity, and nature of the case in
determining how much time to allow the debtor to formulate and file its
plan. In the districts where I practiced, the deadlines for filing plans in
ordinary cases were fixed at thirty days after the first meeting of
creditors, and the deadlines for larger debtors typically were fixed at
sixty. Few extensions were granted.
One of the key concepts behind Chapter 11 was to remove
bankruptcy judges from the administration of bankruptcy cases and permit
them to act solely in a judicial capacity. Some of the drafters, probably
those most familiar with large cases, thought that creditors and their
67.
For example, the number of cases in each chapter during the last year of the
Act were as follows: 55 cases in Chapter X; 3339 cases in Chapter XI; and 720 cases in
Chapter XII. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS DURING THE TWELVE MONTH PERIOD OCTOBER, 1978SEPTEMBER,

1979, at 70.

68.
Under Chapter XI of the former law, a plan of reorganization could not affect
secured debts. Chapter 11 permits plans to affect secured debt. The change enables many
companies that could not have reorganized effectively under the old law to do so under
the new law. It has certainly strengthened the hands of debtors in negotiations with
secured creditors. But there is little reason that this more effective relief should take
significantly longer to administer. In fact, one might expect negotiations with secured
creditors to be concluded more quickly in a system where the debtor has an alternative
to negotiations for dealing with its secured creditors.
When a debtor seeks to cram down a plan against secured creditors under Chapter
11, it may be necessary to litigate over the value of the collateral. That kind of litigation
does not necessarily delay the case. See LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's
Share, supra note 19, at 144-46 (trials of the values of the assets of three of the largest
reorganizing companies each concluded in a single day). Nevertheless, it remains possible
that the parties' expectation that valuation litigation will be long and costly would result
in some slowing of the cases. Id. at 148.
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committees would assume the case management function. Others,
probably those who had experience with smaller cases, thought that an
administrative agency would be needed to replace the judge as case
manager.' A compromise was struck in which the judges were relieved
of administrative tasks such as monitoring cases and keeping them
moving, the committee system was strengthened in the hope that creditors
would assume that task, and a U.S. Trustee program was established in
pilot districts to be ready for nationwide implementation if they did not.
Consistent With the new, entirely judicial role of bankruptcy judges,
Chapter 11 prohibits judges from attending the meeting of creditors?0
Though technically the judges continued to have the authority to fix the
time for filing a plan, 7' the provisions of the new law removed them
from the occasion. Moreover, other provisions of Chapter 11 that gave
the debtor in possession the exclusive right to file a plan within the first
120 days of the case' seemed to suggest that the routine fixing of times
was no longer appropriate. The establishment of the 120 day "period of
exclusivity" was accepted by the bankruptcy courts as a congressional
determination that Chapter 11 debtors should be given a longer time in
which to reorganize.
The immediate effect of the change was apparent from data I
gathered on the first Chapter 11 cases filed in the Western District of
Missouri. For the first few months, the bankruptcy judges continued to
fix the debtor's time for filing a plan at sixty days.' But they soon
accepted the philosophy of Chapter 11 expounded by the Advisory
Committee on Bankruptcy Rules, that "[t]he debtor in possession may file
a plan within 120 days after the order for relief."74 Debtors quickly
took advantage of the additional time allowed them. During the first year
after adoption of Chapter 11, the median time within which plans were
filed in the Western District of Missouri rose to 120 days. 3 The new
attitude was captured in a debtor's prefiling threat to a creditor that once
his company filed under Chapter 11 "you can't touch us for four
months."76
69.
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 5-8 (1973).
70.
Bankruptcy Code § 341(c).
71.
Bankruptcy Code § 11 12(b)(4) authorizes the court to dismiss a Chapter 11
case or convert it to Chapter 7 for "failure to propose a plan ... within any time fixed
by the court."
72.
Bankruptcy Code § 1121(b).
73.
See LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control 11, supra note 11, at 270.
74.
Id. This statement of the "philosophy" comes from the Advisory Committee
on Bankruptcy Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Suggested Interim
Rules, Rule 3006(a) cmt.
75.
See LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control 11, supra note 11, at 271.
76.
Id.
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The 120 day limit proved not to be much of a limit. Many of the
bankruptcy courts adopted lenient policies on the granting of extensions,
particularly when the motions seeking them were unopposed. Debtors
who failed to meet the 120 day deadline or obtain an extension usually
suffered no consequences.' In his study of cases filed three to four
years after the effective date of the Code, Kerkman found that the median
time from the filing of the case to filing of a plan in the Eastern District
of Wisconsin was 193 days.' The dramatic increase in the length of
ordinary Chapter 11 cases was well under way.
The new Chapter 11 procedures added other delays. Once a plan
was filed under Chapter XI, the court had been able to set a hearing on
confirmation and send the plan out for a vote of the creditors. Chapter
11 added an additional step. A disclosure statement had to be filed along
with the plan and then approved by the court on at least twenty-five days
notice. 9 Votes for or against the plan could be solicited only on the
basis of an approved disclosure statement.' Thus, once a plan was filed
in the Chapter 11 case, the next step was to schedule a hearing on
disclosure. Only after the disclosure statement was approved could the
court set a hearing on confirmation and send the plan out for a vote.
In theory, each of these procedural obstacles could have been
overcome. The courts could have held status conferences and used them
as the occasion for fixing early dates for the filing of plans in small
Their failure violated no rule. Legally, the only consequence of expiration
77.
of exclusivity was that other parties in interest could file a plan. Particularly in small
cases, expiration makes little difference because continued operation of the business
ordinarily requires the cooperation of the owner-managers, while liquidation leads to so
much poorer a result that the courts are reluctant to permit it. See, e.g., id. (counsel
failed to obtain extensions of exclusivity in 31% of cases in which debtor did not file a
plan within period of exclusivity; none of the failures resulted in any adverse
consequences to the debtor). In our study of large cases, Whitford .and I found that the
lawyers who participated considered exclusivity very important. LoPucki & Whitford,
Venue Choice, supra note 61. See also Harvey R. Miller & Jacqueline Marcus, The
Crumbling Debtor Leverage in Chapter11 Cases-An Implementation or Perversionof the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, in THE WILLIAMSBURO CONFERENCE ON BANKRUPTCY,
CRmQuE OF THE FIRST DECADE UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND AGENDA FOR

REFORM 445 (1988) (stressing importance of exclusivity). Paradoxically, not much
seemed to change when it was allowed to expire. Among the nine cases in which that
occurred in the cases Whitford and I studied, most resulted in the confirmation of plans
jointly proposed by the debtor and the unsecured creditors' committee. Only in the Evans
Products case were creditors able to capitalize on the expiration of exclusivity. Even in
that case, months elapsed before they decided to do so. See LoPucki & Whitford, Venue
Choice, supra note 61, at 36 n.85.
78.
Kerkman, The Debtor in Full Control, supra note 7, at 181.
79. 'Bankruptcy Rule 2002(b).
Bankruptcy Code § 1125(b).
80.
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Chapter 11 cases. Creditors could have pressed for shortening the period
of exclusivity."1 An innovative bankruptcy judge has demonstrated that
it is linguistically possible to construe Bankruptcy Code § 1125 as
permitting the hearing on the disclosure statement to take place after the
statement has been used to solicit votes.' But the data presented in
Figure 1 show that the obstacles were not in fact overcome. The more
cumbersome procedure of Chapter 11 greatly increased the time in
bankruptcy reorganization for routine cases.
IV. CONTROLLING TIME INCHAPTER 1I
A. Small Cases
While the pre-1979 Bankruptcy Act had many shortcomings, its
saving grace was that it had separate procedures for large and small cases.
Though the separation could not always be made effectively, the cases of
large, publicly held companies were supposed to proceed under Chapter
X, while Chapter XI was designed for the needs of smaller companies.
Under that statutory scheme, ordinary cases proceeded at more than twice
the speed of the cases of large, publicly held companies. As I
demonstrated in Part II, eight years after Chapter 11 became effective, the
two groups of cases were proceeding at virtually the same pace. The
lesson to be learned from this case management disaster is that when
small cases are processed in a procedure designed for large cases, the
small cases.will tend to take just as long as the large ones.
The disaster did not go unnoticed. Studies of routine Chapter 11
cases conducted shortly after adoption of the Bankruptcy Code showed
that many cases remained stalled in Chapter 11 because it was not in the
interests of the debtors to move them forward and because the creditors
were unrepresented.' 3 The committee system that had been successful
in the context of large Chapter 11 cases failed in the context of routine
81.
The court has the authority to reduce for cause the period during which the
debtor has the exclusive right to file a plan. Bankruptcy Code § 1121(d).
82.
See infra notes 89-90,and accompanying text.
83.
The principal such study was conducted by a consulting firm retained by the
U.S. Department of Justice. ABT STUDY, supra note 56. The Abt Study did not
determine the total time companies remained in Chapter 11. Instead, its focus was on
periods of inactivity that occurred while the companies remained in Chapter 11. It found,
for example, that even in pilot districts in which the U.S. Trustee system was in
operation, 46% of Chapter 11 cases had "periods of inactivity." Id. at 80. A period of
inactivity was defined as a period for which the court file contained "no evidence of any
activity (e.g., motions, hearing, filing of a plan) by the creditors, debtors, [or] a case
administrator." Id. at 79. The median period of inactivity in pilot districts was 134 days.
Id. at 80.
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Chapter 11 cases." In large part to remedy this problem, the U.S.
Trustee system was expanded nationwide and its attorneys were charged
with "monitoring the progress of cases under title 11 and taking such
actions as the United States trustee deems to be appropriate to prevent
undue delay in such progress."' As yet, there is no evidence that the
system has had a significant effect in this regard.'
84.
The assumption initially was that creditors would form committees and
provide the needed checks on management. Essentially that occurred in large cases. See
LoPucki & Whitford, BargainingOver Equity's Share, supranote 19, at 137-41; LoPucki
& Whitford, CorporateGovernance,supranote 6, at 681. But in small cases, the system
for forming and representing committees broke down. Committees were formed in less
than half of the cases. See, e.g., LoPucki, The Debtor in Full ControlII,supranote 11,
at 250 (committees formed in 40% of the cases).
The drafters assumed that members of the committees would be personally active
in the Chapter 11 cases, even though they could not be compensated. 'In large cases,
where committee members may have millions of dollars at stake, the drafters' assumption
is largely justified. But for creditors whose debts are measured in the thousands of
dollars, uncompensated service on a creditor's committee is not cost effective.
As I have discussed at length elsewhere, the only way to make the committee system
work in small cases is essentially to abuse it. See LoPuCKI, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS,
supra note 22, § 10.5. The committee hires an attorney (who can be compensated for his
or her legal work). The attorney performs the work of the committee and bills it to the
estate as legal work. Id. § 10.8.3. Most of the committees that were formed in small
cases did not even retain counsel. See, e.g., ABT STUDY, supra note 56, at 58. The
result was that small case debtors completely dominated their Chapter 11 cases, to the
complete frustration of their creditors. See LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control Hi, supra
note 11.
85.
28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(G) (1988).
The legislation expanding the U.S. trustee system nationwide was adopted in
86.
1986 and implementation began immediately. The first phase of expansion of the system
was completed some time prior to April, 1988. See LYNN M. LoPUCKI, LAW &
BusmIEss DIRECTORY OF BANKRupTcY ATTORNEYS 1989, xv, xvi (1989) (statement of
John E. Logan, General Counsel, Executive Office for United States Trustees in April,
1988 describing the first phase of the expansion as "already complete"). The sample of
cases studied by Ed Flynn, of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, was drawn
from cases that remained pending in 1987. While the sample showed longer times under
Chapter 11 than prior studies, the U.S. Trustee program was still too new to be held
responsible on that basis alone.
There are two indications, however, that implementation of the U.S. Trustee system
has not had much impact on the time companies spend under Chapter 11. First, the
expansion of the U.S. Trustee system into Wisconsin was complete no later than April of
1988. My study in the Western District of Wisconsin examined cases filed in 1987 and
1988; those cases remained pending for a median time of 17.5 months. See supra note
52. Second, the U.S. Trustee system had been operating in 18 pilot districts, including
the Southern District of New York, for several years before Flynn's study. The median
times in reorganization in that district under the Act had been eight months (single
payment cases) and 11 months (multiple payment cases). See STANLEY & GIRTH, supra
note 48, at 143. Eight years after the Code took effect and established the U.S. Trustee
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Bankruptcy Judge Thomas Small conceived of a bolder solution. In
1987, he implemented a procedure to shorten the time Chapter 11 cases

remained pending in his court." After various adjustments over the
years, the procedure remains in effect. In "small business" cases8 filed
in his court, Judge Small orders the debtor to file a plan and disclosure

statement within sixty or ninety days of the commencement of the case.
Shortly after the debtor does so, Judge Small "conditionally" approves the
disclosure statement" and sets a hearing on confirmation. By doing so,

Judge Small eliminates what most judges had thought was a mandatory
delay necessary to give notice and conduct a hearing on approval of the
disclosure statement.

Instead, Judge Small permits debtors to use

conditionally approved disclosure statements to solicit votes on the plan.
He considers whether to finally approve the disclosure statements at the
hearings on confirmation of the plans. While Judge Small's procedural
innovation is legally questionable,' his "fast track" has been successful
in reducing the time companies spend under Chapter 11 in his district.
It was received favorably by most of the bankruptcy community91 and

the national media, 2 and has inspired other experiments."
system in that district, the median time in Chapter 11 was 20 months. FLYNN, supra note
51, at 12.
87.
See John Greenwald, The Bankruptcy Game, TIME, May 18, 1992, at 60
("Under a fast track that U.S. bankruptcy Judge A. Thomas Small installed in 1987, firms
file their reorganization plans within 90 days and average just six months in court.");
Mary Graham, Bankrupt and Bullish, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 1992, at 24, 40 ("Plans have
to be filed quickly, paperwork is simplified, and cases take an average of seven months.")
88.
As the program currently operates, Judge Small reviews each Chapter 11 case
as soon as it is filed. Based on the sizes of the debts shown in the lists of the 20 largest
creditors and other available information, he orders that about 50% to 70% of the cases
proceed as small business cases. Telephone interview with Judge A. Thomas Small (Oct.
20, 1992).
89.
Judge Small conditionally approves the disclosure statements based on his
reading of them, without either notice or a hearing. If he does not approve a particular
statement, he enters an order that explains the reasons and gives the debtor an opportunity
to cure the defect. Final approval of the disclosure statement is made after notice and a
hearing, typically at the same time as the confirmation hearing. Id.
90.
The Bankruptcy Code provides that "[a]n acceptance or rejection of a plan
may not be solicited... unless... before such solicitation, there is transmitted to such
holder.. . a written disclosure statement approved, after notice and a hearing, by the
court.. .. " Bankruptcy Code § 1125(b). The text does not explicitly provide that the
approval must occur before the transmission, but there can be little doubt that was the
intent.
91.
See, e.g., George W. Hay, Lawyers Overwhelmingly Endorse Judge Small's
"Fast Track" ]Is, TURNAROUNDS & WORKOUTS, July 15, 1989, at 1. See also the
comment of Kenneth Klee, infra note 123..
92.
See articles cited supra note 87.
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Ironically, the procedure that has evolved under Judge Small's fast
track looks much like that under former Chapter XI. The results too are
much the same. Ignoring the Southern District of New York, where
cases were generally larger, reorganization under Chapter XI had taken
a median time of about six months;' reorganization under Judge Small's
9
fast track has been taking an average of about six or seven months. 5
Based largely on the success of Judge Small's experiment, legislation
that would create a pilot program for a small business reorganization
chapter of the Bankruptcy Code (Chapter 10), was introduced in Congress
in 1992. The legislation incorporated both of the key elements of Judge
Small's fast track. Under it, plans would have had to be filed within
ninety days of the commencement of the case, and plans could have been
set for confirmation hearing as soon as they were filed. 9' The proposed
Chapter 10 was not included in the legislation as it was passed by the
House, and the legislation ultimately died at the end of the session. The
legislation has been reintroduced this year.'
The current proposal for a new Chapter 10 has a number of serious
flaws, which may prevent its enactment. But the adoption of a separate
set of reorganization procedures for small business bankruptcy is a critical
step toward reducing the length of time small companies spend under the
protection of the bankruptcy court.
B. Large Cases
The problem of delay in large reorganization cases is long standing
and probably less tractable. It is certainly intuitively plausible that large
complex cases inherently require more time than small, simple ones. But
there is also reason to believe that even large cases can move considerably
faster than they now do.
In our recent study of the bankruptcy reorganization of large,
publicly held companies, Whitford and I discovered that many, if not
most, such companies sought to complete their reorganization cases as
quickly as possible." In order to minimize the time they would spend
under Chapter 11, a few even formulated their plans and obtained the
93.
See, e.g., Lisa Hill Fenning, The Future of Chapter 11: One View from the
Bench, 1993 ANN. SuRv. BANKR. LAW (forthcoming) (advocating an active role for
judges in Chapter 11 case management).
94.
See supra note 48.
95.
See supra note 87.
96.
S. 1985, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 205(c) (1992).
97.
S. 540, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
98.
LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 6, at 729 n.256.
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acceptance of key classes of creditors before filing. Such "prepackaged"

cases were sometimes completed in two or three months.
At the other extreme, there were companies that found direct
economic advantage in remaining in Chapter 11 for as long as possible.'
Fortunately, the number of these companies was small."° Between the
extremes were companies in such turmoil that they found it difficult or

impossible to formulate a plan, 1 companies that sought delay because
they did not have the cash necessary to begin making payments under the
plan, and companies that believed they could not formulate a plan until
some major piece of litigation was resolved." °

One of the most important causes of delay was impasse in bargaining
over the plan. This kind of delay is largely caused by Chapter 11
procedure and is therefore capable of reduction. The pathology is as
follows. The Bankruptcy Code permits Chapter 11 debtors initially to

remain in possession of their assets. It gives them the exclusive right to
file a plan during the first 120 days of the case, with such extensions as
the court may allow."°3 So long as the debtor retains the right of
exclusivity, the case can go forward only on terms proposed by the
debtor. In thirty-four of the forty-three cases Whitford and I studied
(79%), exclusivity was continued throughout the case."°4 The debtors
99.
For example, during its stay in Chapter 11, Itel Corporation had hundreds of
millions of dollars in cash, invested at interest rates as high as 23% per year. Because
the company was insolvent and the creditors' claims were nearly all unsecured, no interest
was accruing on them. The longer Itel could remain in bankruptcy, the more cash it
would have and the closer to solvent it would be. Both effects tended to strengthen the
hand of management.
100.
The other companies that sought direct economic advantage through delay
were principally oil and gas companies that were trying to hold off creditors until the
market for their properties improved.
101.
A company need not solve all of its business problems before proposing a
plan. All that is necessary is that the company have a business plan for the future (so it
knows which assets to sell or abandon) and that it be sufficiently stable that one can make
at least a rough estimate of its value. Turmoil at such a level that the company could not
propose a plan usually lasted no more than a few months and rarely lasted as much as a
year.
102.
For example, the Internal Revenue Service assessed taxes against Storage
Technology that the company could neither discharge nor pay. Storage Technology
disputed the taxes and asserted that until the dispute was resolved, no plan it might
propose could meet the feasibility test of Bankruptcy Code § 1129(a)(1 1). Debtors should
not be permitted to win delays based on this argument. To reduce the time companies
spend under Chapter 11, debtors should be required to propose plans that expressly
provide for the possibility that the litigation will be resolved adversely to the debtor.
Those plans might specify the circumstances under which the emerging companies may
have to be reorganized again or liquidated. See id.
103.
Bankruptcy Code § 1121.
104.
LoPucki & Whitford, Venue Choice, supra note 61, at 31 n.67.
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in many of these cases were suffering from delay, but the key to
understanding the bargaining leverages was to realize that their creditors
were suffering much more. For many debtors, the difference was great
enough that they could trade movement of the case for substantive
concessions from other parties. But persuading the creditors that they
could not move the case without the debtor's cooperation frequently
required demonstration. Hence, the delay.
For a debtor to demonstrate this kind of control over the movement
of the case, the debtor must have the cooperation of the bankruptcy judge
in the form of extensions of exclusivity. In a few cases we studied, the
debtor did not have that cooperation."' But in the large majority, it
did.
Why would so many judges cooperate in such a dubious show of
power? After studying the pattern of venue choice in these cases,
Whitford and I concluded that a combination of active forum shopping
and a desire on the part of many bankruptcy judges to participate in these
large and glamorous cases provides a substantial part of the
explanation." ° In short, debtors sought out judges inclined to extend
exclusivity, and judges who wanted large cases exhibited a bias in favor
of extensions. Those who demonstrated a proclivity to lift exclusivity
early never got the chance to do it. The cases went elsewhere. 7 The
respectability of these otherwise dubious practices was enhanced by the
public support of the most prominent members of the bankruptcy bar for
a policy of liberal extensions of exclusivity."8 Exclusivity favored the
interests of those attorneys perceived as "insiders" because it put an
emphasis on negotiations." °
Other factors combined with extensions of exclusivity to place a
destructive and unwarranted emphasis on negotiation as the only
reasonable means of resolving large reorganization cases. The first was
the myth, frequently repeated and almost universally accepted among
105.
The most obvious example was Evans Products, which was owned by
notorious corporate raider Victor Posner. Miami bankruptcy judge Thomas Britton
refused to grant even a single extension of exclusivity. After withdrawing an offer to
equity holders worth more than $18 million, creditors were successful in cramming down
a plan that paid nothing to equity. Despite considerable delays in the bargaining process,
the entire case took only a little more than one year to complete. See id. at 36 n.85.
106.
Id.
107.
In the period covered by our study, large, publicly held debtors were
avoiding the bankruptcy courts in Philadelphia, Boston, and Miami. The most popular
destination was New York City. Id. at 29-33. Since that time, Delaware has become the
most popular destination for cases of large, publicly held companies.
108.
See, e.g., Miller & Marcus, supra note 77.
109.
LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share, supra note 19, at
154-57.
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bankruptcy experts, that cram downs against underwater interests were
not feasible in large Chapter 11 cases. "Responsible" lawyers, the myth
maintains, agree to consensual plans in which everybody gets
something."' Indeed, the myth is so widely believed that it has in large
part become self-fulfilling. Judges who think adjudication is impractical
are reluctant to terminate exclusivity because termination cannot
accomplish anything. By refusing to terminate, they prevent it from
accomplishing anything. 1" Instead, these judges pressure the parties'
representatives to reach agreement. In the cases Whitford and I studied,
judges applied such pressure by holding oversight hearings at which they
reviewed the progress of negotiations, withholding approval of attorneys
fees, and even changing the membership of recalcitrant committees."'
Negotiations are desirable, but to rely on them to the exclusion of
adjudication is a recipe for disaster. In the case of large reorganization
cases, the disaster comes in the form of extensions of exclusivity that
cause cases to drag on for years.
Whitford and I have proposed two reforms to speed the resolution of
large reorganization cases. The first is what we call "preemptive cram
down." Early in the case, after notice and a hearing, the court
"extinguishes the interests of the shareholders of clearly insolvent debtors.
The purpose [is] to prevent shareholders who have no plausible claim to
share in the distribution under the absolute priority rule from disrupting
the reorganization process in the hopes of obtaining such a share through
negotiations.""' Preemptive cram down can be used to eliminate the
interests of creditors as well, although there are probably many fewer
cases in which that is appropriate."4 We think the elimination from the
bargaining process of parties who have no legal right 5 to share in the
110.
Id. at 156-58.
111.
Id.at 157.
112.
For example, when the equity committee in the Manville case refused to
agree to a plan, the court dissolved the committee and refused to appoint a new one.
Counsel for the committee withdrew, and the plan was crammed down against the
.unrepresented shareholders. Id. at 145.
113.
Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, PreemptiveCram Down, 65 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 625, 625 (1991).
114.
id. at 643-44.
115.
Arguably, under the "new value exception" to the absolute priority rule, the
underwater shareholders of a reorganizing company have the right to retain ownership of
the company by, in essence, purchasing the company under the plan. The argument
should not prevent preemptive cram downs from occurring. First, the new value
exception may not exist. See In re Route 37 Business Park Assocs., 146 B.R. 640, 64548 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1992) (holding that the new value exception exists, but citing numerous
cases contra). Second, even if it does exist, the new value exception confers no rights
that would be violated by preemptive cram down against underwater interests. See
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distribution can eliminate a good deal of unnecessary threats, litigation,
posturing, and negotiating.
The second reform we have proposed is to reduce the discretion of
"The
bankruptcy judges with regard to extensions of exclusivity.
reduction might be accomplished by promulgating reviewable standards
for granting extensions, limiting extensions to fixed periods of time,
perhaps one year,116 requiring that applications for extensions be heard
by a district judge, or some combination of these proposals."""
Our theory is that the knowledge that exclusivity will be lifted early
in the case will motivate debtors to strike their bargains as early as
possible, before the leverage conferred on them by exclusivity begins to
dissipate. That large reorganization cases took considerably longer in the
Southern District of New York where exclusivity was rarely lifted"'
suggests that assuring debtors of lengthy extensions in fact leads to delay.
Our observations of cases in which exclusivity was lifted suggest that
there are no dire consequences.11 9

V. DOES CHAPTER 11 HAVE A FUTURE?
In the 1970s, when the National Bankruptcy Commission and
congressional aides set about designing what eventually became Chapter
11, they turned, not surprisingly, to the most prestigious members of the
bankruptcy bar for guidance. The experience of those lawyers was
primarily in large cases. They conceived a procedure that addressed the
realities of corporate reorganization as they knew them. The procedure,
as I have demonstrated here, was unsuited to small cases.
The requirement that both multi-national corporations and corner
grocery stores reorganize by the same procedures more than doubled the
time ordinary companies spend in reorganization. That more than
doubling has exacerbated a variety of other problems, discredited the
reorganization process, and made the repeal of Chapter 11 no longer
unthinkable.
As mentioned, legislation that would create a new Chapter 10 of the
Bankruptcy Code to address the source of these problems is currently
pending before Congress." 2 The legislation has a number of flaws. It
LoPucki & Whitford, Preemptive Cram Down, supra note 113. The purpose of the
exception is to benefit creditors, not debtors. Warren, supra note 18, at 39-42.
The current bill pending before Congress would implement this proposal. See
116.
S. 540, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (1993).
LoPucki & Whitford, Venue Choice, supra note 61, at 48.
117.
118.
Id. at 31 n.67.
See supra note 77.
119.
120.

S. 540, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (1993).
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is not my intent here to endorse Chapter 10, but only the general concept
of separate procedures for small and large reorganization cases. Congress
21
could implement that concept in a number of different ways.
Whether Congress corrects its mistake is more important than how it does
so.

Unfortunately, the same interests that led Congress to combine large
and small cases in a single chapter in 1978 stand ready to oppose their
separation now. The most influential group has been the National
Bankruptcy Conference, a private organization whose members dominated
the National Bankruptcy Commission during the 1970s and shaped the
1978 legislation. The National Bankruptcy Conference has drafted, and
is expected soon to release, a report containing its own analysis of the
shortcomings of Chapter 11. The report contains no proposals aimed at
reducing the time that companies, large or small, remain in
reorganization. "
Individual members of the Conference have been outspoken in their
opposition to the proposed Chapter 10."z In a recently published
article,"

Conference chairman Leonard Rosen argued that "[a]lthough

some changes in Chapter 11 are needed, its basic structure is solid and
should be left alone."" z He states his opposition to the proposed
creation of a new Bankruptcy Commission that might revisit the decisions
121.
Though no legislation has been introduced, members of the bankruptcy
community have discussed for some time the possibility of permitting the smallest
incorporated businesses to file under already existing Chapter 13. See, e.g., John C.
Akard, Chapter 13for Small Business?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 1992, at 17. The
effect would be much the same as the adoption of Chapter 10.
122.
See National Bankruptcy Conference Code Review Project (working draft)
(Sept. 1, 1992) (on file with Author).
123.
For example, The National Law Journal reported the following comment by
a prominent member of the National Bankruptcy Conference:
Bankruptcy lawyer Kenneth N. Klee, a principal draftsman of the 1979
Bankruptcy Code, said the Chapter 10 issue was debated at length in the mid1970s and rejected. He said he saw no merit in reviving it.
"We went through this, and it was very wasteful," said Mr. Klee...
"There is no reason why Chapter 11 can't work [on a fast track basis] if the
lawyers know what they are doing and the judges are accommodating," he
said.
Fred Strasser et al., Bankruptcy Bill, NAT. L.J., Sept. 16, 1991, at 29.
The idea that judges can.solve the problem of time in Chapter 11 through better case
management techniques has been echoed elsewhere. E.g., Fenning, supra note 93. Some
judges have adopted ease management techniques that ameliorate the problem. But the
data reviewed and reported in Part II of this Article demonstrate that they have not been
successful.
124.
Leonard M. Rosen, Book, Chapter and Worse, Chapter 11 Needs a Rewrite,
Bus. L. TODAY, July/Aug. 1992, at 47 [hereinafter Rosen, Book, Chapterand Worse].
125.
Id. at 47.
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made in the mid-1970s. 1'
Among the minor changes he advocates,
none is expressly addressed to the length of time cases remain in Chapter
11. He mentions a proposal by turnaround manager Jeffrey Chanin to
limit extensions of the debtor's exclusive right to file a plan to one year,
but rejects it as "too rigid." 2 ' He mentions that Chapter 10 has been
proposed, but says no more about it. From the reforms he does tout, it
is clear that his focus is on the large cases he litigates. Apparently, in
Rosen's view the length of Chapter 11 cases is not a problem.
If the leaders of the bankruptcy bar proceed with their heads in the
sand (or perhaps the metaphor should be with their heads in the kinds of
cases they litigate) they will miss the opportunity to make the necessary
correction. Rosen is correct" in dismissing Michael Bradley and
Michael Rosenzweig's proposal as "just not workable." " But Douglas
Baird's earlier proposal does not suffer the same impracticality."
Congress could repeal Chapter 11 and force the sale of all ailing
companies through Chapter 7. There is precedent. The current,
regulatory scheme for corporate reorganization dates back only to the
1930s. Before that time, sale of companies through equity receiverships
was a common form of reorganization.'
The "market" could resume
its performance of the reorganization function by transferring those
companies to new owners just as it did in the 1930s.
The change would not be efficient. '
The market for small
companies is virtually nonexistent. Without their owner-managers, most
have no value at all. Threatening to sell their business in a market that
does not exist might frighten the owner-managers into dealing with the
company's financial problems earlier. But so would a threat to blow them
up; demolition is considerably cheaper than bankruptcy proceedings.
Whitford and I have argued from our data that, although a market for
large companies exists, it remains too thin to support auction sales in all
cases.'
Without sufficient numbers of bidders, some of the companies
126.
His expressed opposition was to provisions of S. 1985, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1992), which passed the Senate by a vote of 97-0 but died at the end of the session.
127.
Rosen, Book, Chapter and Worse, supra note 124, at 48.
128.
See LoPucki, Strange Visions, supra note 5.
129.
Rosen, Book, Chapter and Worse, supra note 124, at 47.
130.
See Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Casefor Chapter 11, 15 J. LEGAL STUD.
127 (1986) (suggesting that if Chapter 11 were repealed, ailing companies could be
reorganized by selling them to the highest bidder in proceedings under Chapter 7).
131.
For an excellent exposition of the equity receiverships and their relevance to
the current controversy over Chapter 11, see Theodore Eisenberg, Baseline Problems in
Assessing Chapter 11 (June 10, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Author).
132.
See LoPucki & Whitford; Corporate Governance, supra note 6, at 753-67.
133.
See id. at 764.
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would go at fire sale prices." Insiders might use their knowledge and
their positions to acquire their own companies, as they did in the days of
the equity receiverships135 and as they frequently do in the liquidations
of closely held companies today."' The buyers' windfalls would come
at the expense of former shareholders and creditors. The principal buyers
would be investment bankers whose fees and profits on resale would
replace the direct costs of bankruptcy that under the current scheme are
paid primarily to lawyers.
Which institution-the market or the current regulatory scheme-can
best reorganize companies ultimately depends not on how efficiently each
works in theoretical abstraction, but on how efficiently each theory can
be made to work in practice. That brings us back to our starting point.
Beca~ise the cases move so slowly, Chapter 11 destroys companies that
could have been saved, provides a breeding ground for counterproductive,
strategic behavior, and multiplies the cost of reorganization. If all of this
trouble over Chapter 11 does not lead to meaningful reform, repeal may
be the most reasonable course. Even the market might be better than this.

134.
In all probability, a market would quickly form to avail itself of these fire
sale prices. The bidders in this market, however, would not be ultimate users who would
pay fair market value for the assets. They would be intermediaries who would purchase
intending to reap substantial profits by reselling in a commercially reasonable manner.
135.
See Eisenberg, supra note 131.
136.
See LoPuCKi, STRATEOIES FOR CREDITORS, supra note 22, § 11.11.2.
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APPENDIX

Length of time in Chapter 11 for all cases filed in Madison

Division of the Western District of Wisconsin during 1987 and
1988.
Name of Case

Date
Filed

Date
Confirmed

Months in
Chapter

1.

Galvez, Tr'noteo L

09/23/88

02/28/89

5.2

2.

Lane. Linda, M.D. S.C.

02/02/87

09/28/87

7.8

3.

Thompson, James F.

02/02/87

09/28/87

7.8

4.

Cox, "homas L

04/29/88

02/07/89

9.3

5.

Great Lakes Cable TV Installer,
Inc.

04/05/88

02/07/89

10.1

6.

Sand Prairie Conatruction Co.

05/03/88

04/10/89

11.2

7.

Abner Boiling & Heating Co.

08/22/88

08/08/89

11.5

8.

Gesaler, Lawrence R.

10/31/88

01/11/90

14.4

9.

Hanson, John D.

10/13/87

02/03/89

15.7

10.

Andrews, Floyd D.

10/15/87

02/14/89

16.0

11.

Becker, Richard A.

02/20/87

07/11/88

16.7

12.

Lazo's White House, Inc.

01/29/88

07/13/89

11.5

13.

Rasmussen & Assoc. of
Lodi, Inc.

09/27/88

03/29/90

18.0

14.

Vectora of Madison, Inc.

12/18/87

08/29/89

20.4

15.

Foulke Rubber Products

06/10/88

03/22/90

21.4

16.

Foulke, Donald N.

06/10/88

03/29/90

21.6

17.

Arabesque, a linmited partnership

01/13/88

02109/90

24.9

18.

The Klay Kettle Inc.

10/05/87

11/08/89

25.2

19.

Foulke, Billie J.

06/10/88

08/20/90

26.3

20.

Campbell, Susan A.

09/30/88

12/10/90

26.3

21.

Houseworks

03/04/87

05/22/89

26.6

22.

Marcus, Marvin S.

05/20/87

05/15/90

35.9

23.

FPI Inc. f/k/a Freedom Plastics,
Inc.

05/18/87

01/27/92

56.4

24.

Batz Sanitation, Inc.

02/16/88

Still pending

